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Abstract—Cryptographic hash functions are often built on
block ciphers in order to reduce the security analysis of the hash
to that of the cipher, and to minimize the hardware size. Well
known hash constructs are used in international standards like
MD5 and SHA-1. Recently, researchers proposed new modes of
operations for hash functions to protect against generic attacks,
and it remains open how to base such functions on block
ciphers. An attracting and intuitive choice is to combine previous
constructions with tweakable block ciphers. We investigate such
constructions, and show the surprising result that combining a
provably secure mode of operation with a provably secure tweak-
able cipher does not guarantee the security of the constructed
hash function. In fact, simple attacks can be possible when the
interaction between secure components leaves some additional
“freedom” to an adversary. Our techniques are derived from the
principle of slide attacks, which were introduced for attacking
block ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic hash functions are key ingredients in nu-
merous schemes like public-key encryption, digital signatures,
message-authentication codes, or multiparty functionalities.
During the last few years, the focus on hash functions has
dramatically increased, because of new dedicated attacks on
e.g. MD5 and SHA-1, and new generic attacks—that is, which
apply to broad classes of functions. A hash function h should
satisfy (at least)
• collision resistance: it should be hard to find distinct
inputs x and x′ such that h(x) = h(x′)
• second-preimage resistance: given a random input x, it
should be hard to find a distinct x′ such that h(x) = h(x′)
• preimage resistance: given h(x) for a random unknown
x, it should be hard to find a distinct x′ such that h(x) =
h(x′)
Critical generic attacks [1]–[3] were presented against the
classical Merkle-Damga˚rd (MD) iterative mode of operation,
thus threatening all the hash functions using the MD operation
mode (for example, MD5 and SHA-1). An MD hash function
H hashes a message M = M1M2 . . .M as follows: for
1 ≤ i ≤ , compute
hi = f(hi−1,Mi),
where f is called the compression function, and h0 is a pre-
defined initialization vector (IV). Finally the function returns
the hash value H(M) = h.
To prevent from attacks on the MD mode, extended op-
eration modes were proposed (e.g. HAIFA [4], [5]); in this
work we focus on Rivest’s dithered MD (DMD) mode [6],
[7], for its simplicity and better efficiency. DMD was pro-
posed as a general framework for hash functions, and it
remains to be seen how to concretely instantiate the underlying
compression function. Furthermore, we know of no concrete
hash function construction that employs DMD. The question
has been discussed among the community as to whether
the upcoming NIST hash function competition [8] should
concentrate on only concrete hash function proposals, or split
between proposals for operating modes and for compression
functions (cf. [9]).
Block cipher-based constructions for hash functions used
to build on the MD mode [10], [11] (the so-called PGV
schemes) and there is no direct way to extend them to DMD,
because of an additional input to the compression function.
Recently, ad-hoc efficient constructions were analyzed [12],
but it is unclear whether this approach is optimal. A natural
approach suggested by Rivest [6], [7] is to use tweakable block
ciphers [13] to instantiate DMD hash functions. The model of
tweakable block cipher was originally proposed by Liskov,
Rivest, and Wagner to define families of permutations for a
fixed secret key, thus avoiding the slowdown caused by the
key schedule operation.
A. Contribution
We consider two classes of constructions for DMD hash
functions based on tweakable block ciphers, which combine1
1) a secure hash mode of operation
2) a secure tweakable block cipher
3) a secure block cipher-based construction
Then, we show that such constructions do not necessarily lead
to a secure hash function. More precisely, we apply the idea
of slid pairs to find collisions for one of the function classes.
Our attacks apply to broad classes of constructions, and are
independent of the strength of the underlying block cipher
used.
B. Related Work
Dithering of hash functions appeared with the work of
Kelsey and Schneier [1], with generalizations in [4]–[7].
An analysis of dithered hash functions appears in [14], and
constructive results were proposed in [12].
Hash functions based on block ciphers recently attracted
considerable attention, with several results proving security
1The notion of security differs for each of these constructions, see the
corresponding papers [6], [10], [13] for details.
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bounds for constructions with one or more block ciphers [15]–
[18]. Concrete block cipher-based designs include Mael-
strom [19] and Grindahl [20], and implicitly the de facto
standards MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2.
The first known application of the sliding techniques [21]–
[24] to the context of hash functions was by [25]; namely
to slide the compression function of SHA-1. This result was
extended in [26], and later applied to the SHA based block
cipher SHACAL-1. In [27], a slide-style attack was presented
on incremental hash functions based on pair block chaining.
Recently, Gorski et al. applied sliding to mount distinguishing
attacks against Sponge type hash functions [28]; as well as key
recovery attacks on Sponge hash function based MACs. The
generic hash function attacks by Dean [29], and Kelsey and
Schneier [1] exploit a fixed-point of the compression function,
which is similar in spirit to slide attacks [21], [22] and to our
attacks. Our results are the first known work that slide dithered
hash functions.
In [30], attacks were mounted on a hash function mode
based on tweakable block ciphers, so called Tweak Chain
Hash (TCH). This construction, however, is a conventional
hash function (not dithered). The attack on TCH does not
apply to the constructions we consider in this paper.
II. DEFINITIONS
A block cipher is a map E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,
such that EK(·) = E(K, ·) is a permutation of {0, 1}m for all
K ∈ {0, 1}k, and its inverse permutation is written E−1. The
set of all block ciphers with k-bit key and m-bit messages
is denoted Bloc(k,m). A block cipher-based hash function is
a map H : Bloc(k,m) × D → R, where D ⊆ {0, 1} and
R = {0, 1}n, defined iteratively by a compression function
f : Bloc(k,m)×{0, 1}n1 ×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}n2 , where n1 is
the size of a message block, and n2 the size of chaining values.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume m = n1 = n2 = n.
A. Hash Compression Function Modes based on Block Ci-
phers
Among the 12 provably secure hash compression function
modes presented in [10], we will focus on the most popular
ones (which are used in all concrete hash designs):
• the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas [31] (MMO) mode, which con-
structs the compression function by setting
hi = Ehi−1(Mi)⊕Mi.
• the Davies-Meyer mode, somehow the dual of MMO, is
used in the MD5 and SHA functions:
hi = EMi(hi−1)⊕ hi−1.
• the Miyaguchi-Preneel mode [32], [33], notably em-
ployed in Whirlpool [34], where the underlying block
cipher is a variant of Rijndael:
hi = Ehi−1(Mi)⊕ hi−1 ⊕Mi.
B. Tweakable Block Ciphers
Tweakable block ciphers [13] aim to achieve the “best of
both worlds” (security and efficiency) for block cipher-based
hashing, since they allow to use an input-dependent permu-
tation, thus avoiding the time-consuming key schedule—the
additional input (tweak) being injected in a simplistic fashion.
Formally, a tweakable block cipher has three inputs: a
key K ∈ {0, 1}k, a tweak T ∈ {0, 1}t and a message
M ∈ {0, 1}n; it produces a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}n:
E˜ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}t × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
We write E˜K(T,M) as shorthand for E˜(K,T,M). In [13],
two tweakable block ciphers are constructed from conventional
block ciphers:
• TEXE (tweakable cipher formed by two E boxes sand-
wiching an XOR), which is inspired from CBC-MAC and
is defined as
E˜K(T,M) = EK(T ⊕ EK(M)).
It was proven [13] that TEXE is a secure tweakable
cipher in the sense of indistinguishability from a family
of random permutations parametrized by the tweak.
• TFX (inspired from the generalized DESX construction
FX of Kilian and Rogaway [35], [36]) defines the scheme
E˜K(T,M) = EK(M ⊕ U(T ))⊕ U(T ),
where U is a universal hash function TFX is strongly
(chosen-ciphertext) secure in the sense of indistinguisha-
bility from a family of random permutations parametrized
by the tweak (see [13] for details).
III. DITHERED HASH FUNCTIONS (DMD)
Dithering is a generalization of the countermeasure pro-
posed by Kelsey and Schneier [1] to prevent attacks [1], [29]
based on message block repetition and fixed-points. This type
of iterated hash uses a sequence of dither values D = d1 . . . d,
which is public and static.
A dithered Merkle-Damga˚rd (DMD) hash function, as de-
fined in [6], [7], takes as input an IV, a message M =
M1M2 . . .M, a dither sequence D = d1d2 . . . d, and pro-
duces an output HD(M) as follows: for 1 ≤ i ≤ , compute
hi = f(hi−1,Mi, di)
where f is the compression function, the hi’s are chaining
variables; h0 is the IV and the dither values d0, . . . , d−1 have
a zero most significant bit (MSB), and d, the last dither value,
has nonzero MSB.
In the above definition, a special MSB encoding of di
differentiates the last block from other blocks. This feature
was proposed to avoid a complex message padding rule
(unlike classical MD functions, which append to a message
the encoding of its bit length).
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IV. DMD CONSTRUCTIONS
We consider constructions of DMD hash functions where
the compression function is instantiated with a tweakable
block cipher, in one of the 12 provably secure PGV modes
[11]. The dither input di of the compression function is
directed to the tweak input T of the tweakable block cipher
as suggested in [6], [7]. We focus on the MMO mode to
simplify the description, though our results equally apply to
other modes as detailed in Section V-A.
A. DMD-TEXE in MMO Mode
This construction of a DMD function combines the TEXE
and MMO schemes, which respectively add a new input slot
and construct a secure compression function. Following our
above definitions, DMD-TEXE with the MMO scheme defines
hi = f(hi−1,Mi, di)
= E˜hi−1(di,Mi)⊕Mi
= Ehi−1(di ⊕ Ehi−1(Mi))⊕Mi.
This construction, however, is inefficient, since each call to
the compression function requires two encryptions with the
block cipher E, plus one key schedule (both encryptions use
the same key).
B. DMD-TFX in MMO Mode
This construction is more efficient than DMD-TEXE, since
it requires only one encryption (and the key schedule), plus
a call to a universal hash function, which is generally faster
than the block cipher in practice. This construction defines:
hi = f(hi−1,Mi, di)
= E˜hi−1(di,Mi)⊕Mi
= Ehi−1(Mi ⊕ U(di))⊕ U(di)⊕Mi
= Ehi−1(Mi ⊕ U(di))⊕ (Mi ⊕ U(di)).
V. COLLISION ATTACK
We show how to mount a free-start collision attack on
DMD-TFX in MMO mode, resulting in a pair of colliding
messages M and M ′ for a predefined IV and another IV ′.
The attack goes as follows, for an arbitrary dither sequence
D = D = d1 . . . d+1:
1) choose an arbitrary ( + 1)-block message M =
M1M2 . . .M+1, and compute HD(M)
2) define a -block message M ′ = M ′1 . . .M ′, where
M ′i = Mi+1 ⊕ U(di+1)⊕ U(di). (1)
3) compute HD(M ′) using the IV h′0 = h0 defined as
h′0 = f(h0,M1, d1) = h1. (2)
Now, Eq. (1) and (2) yield
h′1 = f(h
′
0,M
′
1, d1)
= Eh′0(M
′
1 ⊕ U(d1))⊕ (M ′1 ⊕ U(d1))
= Eh1(M2 ⊕ U(d2))⊕ (M2 ⊕ U(d2))
= f(h1,M2, d2)
= h2.
Then, by induction,
h′i = f(h
′
i−1,M
′
i , di)
= Eh′i−1(M
′
i ⊕ U(di))⊕ (M ′i ⊕ U(di))
= Ehi(Mi+1 ⊕ U(di+1))⊕ (Mi+1 ⊕ U(di+1))
= f(hi,Mi+1, di+1)
= hi+1.
Eventually we have h = h+1 and h′ = h′, and thus
HD(M) = HD(M ′), i.e. a collision.
A. Generalization
This attack generalizes to other DMD-TFX in PGV modes,
for example when the underlying block cipher-based compres-
sion function sets
Ehi−1(Mi ⊕ hi−1)⊕Mi ⊕ hi−1,
or
Ehi−1(Mi ⊕ hi−1)⊕Mi.
These are the PGV mode constructions called f2 and f4
in [11]. Our attack also applies to the PGV mode popularly
known as Miyaguchi-Preneel.
More generally, our attack can in general be applied to
DMD hash functions with symmetric mixing of the message
block and the dither input. Examples of this kind would be
inspired from perceptual hash functions in image authentica-
tion applications [37], [38] of the field of image processing,
from which the notion of “dithering” is inspired. In such hash
functions, the dither input is mixed within the compression
function in the same way as how a message input is mixed,
hence the mixing is symmetric.
We can describe a further generalization, when the com-
pression function f can be expressed as
hi = f(hi−1,Mi, di)
= f ′(hi−1, f1(Mi)⊗ f2(di))
where ⊗ and f1 are arbitrary invertible functions, and f2 is
an arbitrary function, not necessarily invertible.
Our attack can be applied to this case too, by choosing M ′i
such that
f1(M ′i)⊗ f2(di) = f1(Mi+1)⊗ f2(di+1),
i.e., we choose:
M ′i = f
−1
1
{
[f1(Mi+1)⊗ f2(di+1)]⊗−1 f2(di)
}
.
Note that f1 and f2 can be defined to also take the chaining
variable hi−1 as input, and our attack equally applies.
B. Applicability to DMD-TEXE Functions
Functions based on the TEXE construction resist our attacks
since the mixing between Mi and di is not invertible, with
respect to expressing Mi from the above equation in terms of
the other variables hi, hi−1 and di.
It might seem counter-intuitive that DMD is insecure against
our attack when instantiated with TFX yet is resistant when
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instantiated with the essentially weaker [13] TEXE. This might
be because the difference between the two security notions
achieved by TFX and TEXE is in terms of the access to the
decryption oracle, which does not appear to be useful since
PGV modes only make use of the underlying block cipher in
the encryption direction.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Attacks such as [1], [29] seem to provide support for the
hypothesis [6], [7], [39] that the adversary attacking an MD
hash function has too much control over the message block
input to the compression function, and so this control should
be restricted [1], [6], [7], e.g. with dithering which furthermore
makes the process of hashing a message block dependent on
its position within the entire message [39], or alternatively
makes the compression function round-dependent. DMD hash
functions therefore increase the security guarantees, by us-
ing different compressions of the message at each iteration.
However, care should be taken when using dithers for this
restriction, since a dither input, although is predefined, is
another input channel and another degree of freedom that an
adversary could potentially exploit; as our attacks showed.
Viewed from another perspective, even if two copies of the
hash iteration are out of phase thus leading to differences
between the copies due to differing round positions and hence
different dither inputs, an adversary can still use message block
differences to shift the position dependence, and subsequently
offset them.
A countermeasure for our attack is to append to the message
its bit length; this makes the function less efficient and in
fact clashes with the DMD design objective of achieving
efficiency and of eliminating the need for conventional mes-
sage padding. It remains open, though, whether concrete hash
functions should be based on block ciphers, or be dedicated
designs in order to satisfy the very particular security re-
quirements of a hash function, not necessarily captured by
those of block ciphers (cf. notions like indifferentiability, seed-
incompressibility, secure MAC, etc.).
Biham [4] highlights an important point in the design and
analysis of hash functions: that the same technology, principles
and design criteria as block ciphers should be used for hash
functions. He further explains that this is supported by the
fact that the block cipher design criteria of strong avalanche
criterion (SAC) and strong diffusion, ensures that neutral bits
(used to attack hash functions) cannot exist; and a good
example is the case of MDx and SHAx hash functions that
have slow diffusion which probably explains why it is easier
to control differences through their rounds than it is to do so
for block ciphers. Furthermore, it is well known that block
ciphers and hash functions can be converted to each other
through some suitable mode of operation. To this purpose, we
have:
1) considered the security of the dithered MD hash function
construction and how its security is affected by its inter-
actions with the underlying tweakable block cipher and
corresponding block cipher-based compression function
mode.
2) shown how to apply the block cipher cryptanalytic
technique of slide attacks to mount collision attacks on
hash functions.
For the first point, our results show that caution needs to be
exercised when interacting primitives even if they are provably
secure: in this case, the secure tweakable cipher TFX and the
secure MMO (resp. Miyaguchi-Preneel, f2, f4) modes.
For the second point, we contrast between a block cipher
and a hash function in terms of the difficulty of applying the
kind of attacks treated in this paper. In some PGV modes of
operation, the round key input K of the block cipher is the
message block input Mi of the hash function, and while there
exists a key schedule in block ciphers, hash functions either
have no schedule to process message blocks or the schedule is
linear (e.g. SHA). Therefore, round keys going into each round
of the block cipher depend on a master key via a complex
key schedule, and thus the round keys are difficult to control,
whereas the message blocks to the hash function can be easily
controlled by qan attacker.
Furthermore, an adversary attacking a block cipher has no
control over the intermediate states of the cipher, unless one
considers the context of related-key attacks, which even in that
case only gives restricted control in the sense that an adversary
may be able to differentially affect the round keys of two or
more copies of the encryption iteration but yet not know let
alone be able to control what the round key values are. In
contrast for the case of hash functions, the message blocks
that are in some PGV modes the analog of round keys in
block ciphers, are not only known but can be chosen by the
adversary. All these points indicate that it should be easier to
mount sliding techniques to hash functions.
Slide attacks on block ciphers require some form of period-
icity for the encryption or decryption iteration, while for hash
functions we demonstrated that this is no longer necessary
because the difference due to sliding different rounds can
be offset by the mixing of message block differences and
dither inputs. And while the dithering mechanisms proposed
in [6], [7] prevent the attacks in [1], [29] by eliminating
message block repetitions, our attacks apply even if there are
no repetitions in the sequence.
Our work further supports the view [39] that the role that
sequences play in iterated cryptographic constructions needs
to be further studied. In this particular case, nonrepetitive
sequences would complicate slide attacks for block ciphers
but apparently not necessarily for hash functions.
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